




































































































































































































































































































Does society benet from the delegation of monetary policy to cautious and conservative
central bankers? We offer a critical view on the delegation literature and relax seemingly
innocuous assumptions about uncertainty and preferences. First, caution improves
credibility but does not obviate the need for central-bank conservatism. Second, previous
models of delegation have focused on suboptimal forms of conservatism. We derive optimal
concepts of conservatism that mitigate, or eliminate, any residual problem of credibility.
Third, we rationalize why credible monetary policy may be conducive to stable ination and
output.
JEL classication: E50“An important reason to expose central bankers to elected ofc i a l si st h a t ,j u s t
as the latter may have an inationary bias, the former may easily develop a
deationary bias. Shielded as they are from public opinion, cocooned within an
anti-inationary temple, central bankers can all too easily deny ... that cyclical
unemployment can be reduced by easing monetary policy.” (Stanley Fischer,
1994. p. 293)
What principles should motivate the conduct and design of monetary policy? Uncertainty
about what monetary policy can do and disagreement about what it should do have caused
signicant controversy on the practical resolution of this question. Uncertainty about
the transmission mechanism and disagreement about the optimal form of delegation, in
particular, have always complicated the making of policy.
Despite the ongoing debates, policy makers need to take a preliminary stance on how
to implement policy. It seems, more often than not, that their practical response has been
one of caution and conservatism. As reected in the above quote, this immediately raises
the concern whether caution and conservatism are desirable from a social welfare point of
view. And, if they are, there is still the legitimate question whether actual policy makers
conduct policy in an excessively cautious and conservative fashion. But in order to answer
the latter question, a benchmark is needed, and therefore we r s tn e e dt oa n s w e rt h ef o r m e r ,
more fundamental, question: do caution and conservatism improve the making of monetary
policy? This is the central theme of this paper.
Caution in this paper refers to a more neutral, or less activist, stance of policy and
emerges from the interaction between uncertainty and preferences. Conservatism refers
to preferences that are unrepresentative from a social point of view. Our interest in the
normative underpinnings of caution and conservatism is motivated by two observations.
First, there is an unresolved tension between the popular perception that caution and
conservatism are costly and the empirical nding that delegation to independent central
bankers is benecial. If central bankers are cautious and conservative, the latter empirical
nding (also known as the ‘free lunch result of delegation’) seems to suggest that these
features are desirable qualities. But is it really true that caution and conservatism are the
blessings that generate this result? To answer this question, one must r s tc o m eu pw i t ha
social welfare benchmark.
Second, policy makers have felt somewhat uneasy with the descriptive realism of
the proposals suggested by the ‘credibility literature’. This is reected, for example, in the
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constructs and real-world institutions”. In reviewing the literature, Blinder (1998) mentions
two notable exceptions, however, where minds have actually come together. The rst is
the so-called Brainard (1967) conservatism principle that rationalizes why policy makers
want to err on the side of caution. The second is the Rogoff (1985) conservative-central-
banker approach that explains why policy makers with unrepresentative preferences may do
things better. There is thus considerable independent interest in jointly analyzing caution
and conservatism.
This paper rst develops a baseline model of caution that has two key features.
The rst is multiplicative instrument uncertainty, which is introduced to break certainty-
equivalence in the simplest possible manner. The second is a generalization of the standard
quadratic objective function, which helps us to identify the preference parameters that
generate the caution result. The baseline model then used to examine how the popular
notion of weight-conservatism interacts with a motive for caution. The model also allows
us to derive new notions of central-bank conservatism that do not distort output stabilization
and may in principle restore the best feasible equilibrium. Finally, the model formalizes
that “monetary policy can prevent money itself from being a major source of uncertainty”
(Friedman, 1968, p. 12) and implies that the credibility of monetary policy, too, can help
reduce the variability of ination and output. It is shown that conservatism may generate a
strong version of the free lunch result of delegation.
At this stage, it is useful to discuss how our contribution relates to the literature. The
uncertainties surrounding the making of monetary policy received considerable attention
during the 1960’s and early 1970’s. Important contributions include those of Brainard
(1967) on the effectiveness of policy under multiplicative uncertainty, Friedman (1968) on
the merits of xed rules when lags are long and variable, and Poole (1970) on the choice of
an intermediate target under additive uncertainty. The question how policy makers operate
under uncertainty has recently received renewed interest. Notable contributions within the
standard quadratic paradigm include Swank (1994), Letterie (1997) and Pearce and Sobue
(1997). There is also a growing body of research on learning and optimal control theory
in dynamic environments with multiplicative uncertainty1 but none of these contributions
addresses the delegation of monetary policy to conservative central banks.
1Interestingly, this literature has illustrated the possibility of uncertainty leading to increased policy
aggressiveness. See Craine (1979), Sargent (1998) and Onatski and Stock (1998).
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convenient framework. This literature traditionally features a role for policy that is clouded
by various policy conicts, such as the temptation to misuse monetary policy and the trade-
off between ination and output variability. The analysis of monetary policy delegation
gained much impetus with the application of the notion of time-inconsistency (Kydland
and Prescott, 1977) to monetary economics (Barro and Gordon, 1983a), which led to the
discovery ofacredibilityproblemintheformofaninationarybias. Muchofthesubsequent
literature has then looked for possible mechanisms that reduce or remove this credibility
problem without compromising the exibility needed for output stabilization. Barro and
Gordon (1983b) and Canzoneri (1985) suggest reputational forces that may restore the best
feasible equilibrium.
One prominent approach suggests the delegation of monetary policy to an
independent central banker with incentives distinct from those of the government. Walsh
(1995) and Persson and Tabellini (1993) have argued that the apparent trade-off between
credibility and exibility arises because the delegation mechanism is restricted to ad-
hoc incentive structures. If instead an ination contract ensuring an optimal incentive
structure were introduced, the best feasible equilibrium would prevail with full credibility
and exibility simultaneously. Our approach does bear some similarity to Walsh (1995),
who highlighted how restrictive assumptions on the delegation mechanism may generate a
credibility-exibility trade-off. This branch of the credibility literature, however, does not
have anything to say about central-bank conservatism. Moreover, as is the case for most
of the credibility literature, the issue of caution is ignored: most studies assume that the
transmission mechanism is either deterministic or subject only to additive uncertainty.
Instead, we draw on another branch of the credibility literature. Rogoff (1985)
proposes the delegation of monetary policy to central banks with divergent preferences and
shows that the appointment of a ‘weight-conservative’ central banker improves the problem
of imperfect credibility.2 However, given that the notion of weight-conservatism refers to
t h er e l a t i v ep r e f e r e n c ef o ri n ation versus output stabilization, complete removal of the
inationary bias would entail too high a cost in terms of output variability. As a result, a
suboptimal equilibrium is obtained and this has been the reason why attention has for some
time shifted away from delegation mechanisms based on conservatism.
2S e ea l s oF l o o da n dI s a r d( 1989), Lohmann (1992), Waller (1992), Waller and Walsh (1996).
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enriching the environment in which the central bank conducts policy. Herrendorf and
Lockwood (1997) and Svensson (1997a) suggest that weight-conservatism may be useful
when the inationary bias is state-contingent and the delegation decision is not. Rather than
enriching the environment so that a role for weight-conservatism re-emerges, our approach
suggests a review of the notion of weight-conservatism itself.
An interesting contribution that also reconsiders the concept of conservatism is
Svensson (1997b). He shows that conservatism in the form of a lower ination target may
lead to the best feasible equilibrium, where ination settles down at its socially optimal
level. However, as suggested by King (1997), this proposal raises doubts as it is implied that
central banks should target ination rates that are anticipated to be missed systematically.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 develops the baseline
model. Section2discussesmonetarypolicydelegationunderstandardquadraticpreferences.
Section 3 introduces generalized preferences and derives optimal notions of conservatism.
Section 4 applies the model to the free lunch result of delegation. The last section concludes.
1 Caution in the Making of Monetary Policy
1.1 Description of the Model
We begin with a description of the economic environment. Aggregate supply is represented
by a standard surprise supply function:
y = y¤ + b(¼ ¡ ¼e)+"b > 0; (1)
where y is log of output, y¤ is log of natural output, ¼ is ination, ¼e is expected ination,
and " is a temporary aggregate supply shock with mean 0 and variance ¾2
".
Aggregate demand is controlled by a policy maker, who can generate surprise
ination. Let ip denote the planned deviation of the policy maker’s single instrument from
its neutral level. However, due to multiplicative uncertainty control is imperfect:
¼ = si p; (2)
where s is a shock with mean 1 and variance ¾2
s. All variances in the model are strictly
positive and nite. For analytical convenience, supply and control shocks are independent of
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from the literature which generally assumes that transmission is either deterministic or
subject only to additive uncertainty.3
T h em u l t i p l i c a t i v en a t u r eo ft h es h o c ki sm e a n tt or e ect that policy makers are
more agnostic about the consequences of their actions, the larger the policy deviation they
wish to introduce. The specication implies that loose monetary policy is associated with
more variable ination. This result has strong empirical foundations (Taylor, 1981;B a l la n d
Cecchetti, 1990) and has also been rationalized theoretically. Judd and Scadding (1982), for
example, argue that high ination encourages nancial innovation, which can lead to more
difcult monetary control. Holland (1993) explains how the interaction between ination
uncertainty and heterogeneity of pricing policies at the rm level leads to worse monetary
control at high levels of money growth.
The description of the monetary policy game is standard. There are two players: a
private sector and a policy maker. Before locking itself into a nominal wage contract, the
private sector formulates a prediction (¼e) about the increase in the price level during the
duration of the contract. The strategy of the policy maker is to choose the degree of policy
intervention (ip). The timing is as follows. At time one, the private sector optimally chooses
¼e. At time two, a supply shock " is realized. At time three, the policy maker optimally
chooses instrument ip. At time four, a control shock s is realized and ination, output and
the payoffs of the players are determined. The information set of the private sector at time
one only includes the structure of the model, whereas that of the policy maker at time three
also includes the realization of the supply shock. At the times of their respective decisions,
both players are uninformed about the future realization of the control shock.
The private sector’s objective is to minimize forecast errors. Optimal prediction
requires ¼e = E[¼],w h e r eE[¼] denotes the mathematical expectation over the ination
rate, conditional on the private sector’s information set at time one.
The description of the policy maker’s objective function marks a second departure
from previous work, which generally assumes standard quadratic preferences. We propose
3The simple representation in (2) merely serves to break certainty-equivalence. In practice, randomness
in the relation between policy instrument and policy goal is the result of various, possibly conicting, forces.
Control also becomes more difcult depending on whether one wishes to affect instruments, operating targets,
intermediate targets or ultimate policy goal variables. Shocks to the interest elasticities of money demand and
aggregate demand are examples of factors that constrain the policy maker’s ability to control ina t i o ni na n
accurate manner.
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­ = ¹1 (E [¼])
2 + µ1Va r[¼]
+ ¹2 (E [y] ¡ ky¤)
2 + µ2Va r[y] ; (3)
where ¹1, ¹2, µ1 and µ2 ¸ 0 and k>1. The policy maker is assumed to be concerned
about ination and output. The objective function reects, for each variable, the cost of the
mean-squared bias (MSB) around the target and the cost of variability around the mean. The
ination target has been set to zero. The output target equals ky¤ and exceeds the natural
rate (as k>1). In what follows, the gap between the natural rate and the target rate of
output will be denoted by z ´ (k ¡ 1)y¤ > 0.
Thenovelty of thegeneralized objective function lies in theseparationof the costs of
expected and unexpected deviations in ination and output. Parameters ¹1 and ¹2 measure
the intensity of the policy maker’s aversion to systematically missing the ination and output
target. Parameters µ1 and µ2 measure the policy maker’s preference for nominal and real
stability. Note that the simple quadratic objective function obtains as a special case of (3)
where ¹1 = µ1 and ¹2 = µ2. Setting ¹1 = µ1 = ® and ¹2 = µ2 =1 , we obtain:
Q = E
£
®¼2 +( y ¡ ky¤)2 ¤
; (4)
where ® is the relative weight the policy maker attaches to ination versus output
stabilization around the targets.
We can think of a normative and a political economy justication for the proposed
objective function. From a normative perspective, it may well be the case that society values
expected versus unexpected deviations asymmetrically (resulting in ¹1 6= µ1 and/or ¹2 6=
µ2). For example, if shoe-leather costs of ination are primarily associated with expected
ination and the costs of relative price distortion with unexpected ination, society may
nd expected ination relatively more costly (¹1 >µ 1) if shoe-leather costs are relatively
larger. All we need is that expected and unexpected deviations produce different types or
magnitudes of costs. From a political economy perspective, even if social preferences are
represented by the standard quadratic objective function, there may still be an interest in
delegating monetary policy to an agent who is asked to conduct policy according to the
generalized quadratic objective function.
The generalized objective function serves a double purpose in this paper. First, with
regard to the analysis of caution, it will make sense to focus not only on ‘risk’ (measured by
¾2
s) but also on the ‘price of risk’ (measured by µ1 and µ2). Second, with regard to the role
ECB Working Paper No 25 l  July 2000                                                                                                      11of conservatism, policy maker heterogeneity in terms of ¹1, ¹2, µ1 and µ2 will prove helpful
in the design of optimal delegation mechanisms.
1.2 Equilibrium
We now look for a time-consistent equilibrium. Thanks to the linear-quadratic nature of
the problem, the policy maker’s strategy is given by the following linear policy reaction
function:
ip = ¸1 + ¸2²:
T h er a t eo fi n ation that follows from this reaction function is therefore:
¼ = s(¸1 + ¸2²): (5)
Taking rational expectations over (5), the private sector’s optimal strategy is to set ¼e = ¸1.
The policy maker’s optimal choice of ¸1 and ¸2 minimizes (3) subject to the strategy
of the private sector, the specication of uncertainty, and (1) and (2). After a little algebra,
the objective function can be rewritten as:
































where the rst two lines display the mean-squared biases for ination and output and the last
two lines the respective variances.
It is instructive to examine how the four terms in (6) are affected by ¸1 and ¸2.T h e
credibility part of the policy rule (¸1) shows up in all four terms. The stabilization part of
the policy rule (¸2) matters only for the variance terms. As in the standard literature, optimal
stabilization policy trades off the benet of lower output variability against the cost of higher
ination variability. But now, with multiplicative uncertainty, the policy maker also needs
to take into account the consequences of policy non-neutrality (¸1 6=0or ¸2 6=0 )f o rt h e
variability in ination and output.




















²¸2 = ¡ bµ2¾2
² ; (8)
where ¼e is to be evaluated at ¸1.
Equation (7) illustrates the problem of time-inconsistency. If a formal commitment
technology were to exist, the policy maker could commit to fully take into account the
endogeneity of expected ination with respect to the policy regime (i.e. @¼e=@¸1 =1 ).











However, if no formal commitment technology exists, the endogeneity of expected
ination is not internalized (@¼e=@¸1 =0 ). Optimal policy is then time-inconsistent and











wherethe¸’s without superscripts refer to theno-commitment or discretionary solution. The










Finally, the equilibrium realizations of ination and output equal:
¼ = s(¸1 + ¸2²);
y = y¤ +( s ¡ 1)b¸1 +( 1+sb¸2)²;
where ¸1 and ¸2 are given by (9) and (10).
1.3 Properties of Equilibrium




s (µ1 + b2µ2)
; (12)
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and decreases with the relative preference for the ination versus the output target (¹1=¹2).
The bias is further moderated by the policy maker’s motive for caution. As in Brainard
(1967), caution emerges from the interaction between multiplicative uncertainty and an
aversion to variability. Given that the private sector rationally predicts the policy maker’s
reduced aggressiveness, caution reduces the bias. This point was originally formulated in the
standard quadratic paradigm by Swank (1994) and Pearce and Sobue (1997).4 By separating
outthepreferenceparametersthatreallymatter(namelyµ1 andµ2), thegeneralizedquadratic
objective function allows us to focus more explicitly on what drives the caution result.

















To interpret this expression, note that the rst term derives from the policy maker’s desire to
stabilize output. This desire is moderated due to the presence of control shocks (¾2
s > 0),
which make the policy maker cautious. The second term reects the fact that systematic
policy non-neutrality leads to unwanted ination variability through the multiplicative
shocks.





















The rst term again corresponds to the stabilization desire of the central bank. The second
term reects the fact that systematic policy non-neutrality leads to more output volatility as
control shocks have more scope to drive a wedge between actual and expected ination.
2 Monetary Policy Delegation with Standard Quadratic Objectives
The previous section has shown how the interaction between uncertainty and preferences
produces caution in the conduct of monetary policy. The generalized quadratic objective
function allowed us to identify preference parameters µ1 and µ2 as the driving force behind
4An indirect mechanism that delivers a similar result was proposed by Devereux (1987): uncertainty induces
wage setters to index nominal contracts. This reduces the effectiveness of surprise ination and the temptation
to surprise.
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instrument is always socially optimal.
In what follows, we examine the delegation of monetary policy to agents whose
preferences are socially unrepresentative. In particular, we study various forms of central-
bank conservatism and ask whether these improve social welfare. We r s tk e e pw i t ht h e
standard quadratic paradigm and re-examine the notion of weight-conservatism in a setting
with multiplicative instrument uncertainty. Later, we examine new notions of conservatism
that follow from the introduction of generalized quadratic objectives.
Denote the objective functions of the government and the central bank by:
Q = E
£




®¤¼2 +( y ¡ ky¤)2 ¤
:
The central bank is then said to be weight-conservative if ®¤ >® . Rogoff (1985) showed
that delegation to a weight-conservative central banker reduces the inationary bias at the
expense of output stabilization. And, since the former effect initially dominates the latter, a
nite degree of weight-conservatism generally improves overall welfare.
But does weight-conservatism continue to make sense if policy is already conducted
cautiously? Indeed, one may argue that caution substitutes for weight-conservatism. After
all, caution also results in lower average ination and reduced policy responsiveness to
shocks.5
To answer this question, impose restrictions ¹1 = µ1 = ®¤ and ¹2 = µ2 =1on
Equations (12), (13) and (14) of the baseline model. A weight-conservative central banker










































5Pearce and Sobue (1997) also hinted at the possible substitutability between caution and weight-
conservatism (cf. Footnote 7 in their paper).
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expressions into the government’s objective function and differentiate with respect to ®¤.
The algebra in the Appendix then leads to the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1: (i) Weight-conservatism continues to improve social welfare. (ii) Let






: If moderate conservatism (®¤ <! ) is optimal initially, more
uncertainty leads to less conservatism. If ultra-conservatism (®¤ >! ) is optimal initially,
more uncertainty leads to more conservatism.
TheAppendixprovidesaproof. From(i), itfollowsthatRogoff’s(1985)analysis isrobust to
settings with multiplicative instrument uncertainty. The intuition here is as follows. Caution
reduces the bias and the policy responsiveness to shocks. Although the policy response to
shocks changes, it remains socially optimal. Weight-conservatism also reduces the bias and
the responsiveness of policy to shocks. But, unlike caution, weight-conservatism distorts the
policy response away from what is socially optimal. Because the benet of lower average
ination initially dominates the cost of more variable output, the optimal scheme involves a
nite degree of weight-conservatism.
To interpret (ii), note that moderate conservatism is typically optimal when the
degree of output volatility is large relative to the size of the inationary bias. Increased
uncertainty induces caution, which reduces the policy response to shocks. In an environment
with an already signicant degree of output volatility, this is particularly costly. To offset
some of the increased volatility, weight-conservatism is optimally reduced. If ultra-
conservatism were optimal initially, this trade-off no longer holds. Ultra-conservatism may
be justied on the basis that the inationary bias is much more of a problem than the
volatility of output. In this environment, the use of monetary policy for output stabilization
becomes increasingly second-order to the role that weight-conservatism can play in reducing
the inationary bias. Although increased uncertainty reduces the policy response to shocks,
weight-conservatism is now optimally increased.
3 Monetary Policy Delegation with Generalized Quadratic Objectives
Weight-conservatism continues to improve, but does not remove, the credibility problem of
monetary policy. But why does the government not design a scheme that requires the central
16                                                                                                    ECB Working Paper No 25 l  July 2000banker to behave conservatively in some optimal fashion? We now derive optimal notions
of central-bank conservatism based on the generalized quadratic objective function.
Assume that the objectives of the government and central bank are given by:
­ = ¹1 (E [¼])
2 + ¹2 (E [y] ¡ ky¤)








where the starred coefcients refer to the preference parameters of the central bank.
3.1 Stability-Conservatism
We rst derive an alternative notion of central-bank conservatism that is based on preference
parameters µ¤
1 and µ¤
2. Recall that these measure the preference intensities of the central
bank for nominal and real stability. If we wish to retain the socially optimal stabilization
mix, it must be the case that µ¤
1=µ¤
2 = µ1=µ2. This implies that µ¤
1 = Â¤µ1 and µ¤
2 = Â¤µ2,
where Â¤ measures the central bank’s overall concern for stability. The notion of ‘stability-
conservatism’ then refers to the case where the central banker has a stronger overall
preference for stability than the government has. This would correspond to Â¤ >Â´ 1.
The policy reaction function of a stability-conservative central banker is given by:
ip =
b¹ 2 z
¹1 + Â¤ ¾2






The rst part of this expression is the credibility term. Because of the central bank’s
stronger preference for nominal and real stability, uncertainty is now Â¤ times more costly.
This induces more caution which in turn reduces the inationary bias. The second part is
the stabilization term, which by construction is not affected. Unlike weight-conservatism,
stability-conservatism does not distort output stabilization.
PROPOSITION 2: Delegation of monetary policy to a central banker with an exclusive
concern for stability (Â¤ !1 ) leads to the constrained welfare optimum.
The proof follows simply from the observation that credibility can be improved without
introducing additional distortions.
The notion of stability-conservatism seems to accord with the fact that successful
monetary policy is often attributed to the penchant of central banks for stability. The model
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to the uncertainties surrounding their policy decision. Thus, conservatism reinforces caution
and their combination achieves the constrained social welfare optimum.6
3.2 Target-Conservatism
With the generalized quadratic objective function we can also derive a notion of central-bank
conservatism that is based on preference parameters ¹¤
1 and ¹¤
2. A central banker is said to
be ‘target-conservative’ if, in comparison with the government, more importance is attached
to the ination target than to the output target. This corresponds to ¹¤
1=¹¤
2 >¹ 1=¹2.












Again, only the credibility part of the policy rule is affected. Stabilization remains optimal
throughout.7 It is straightforward to see that extreme target-conservatism (¹¤
2 =0 )l e a d st o
the constrained welfare optimum.8
An ination-targeting regime is of course a natural candidate when we look
for an empirical counterpart of an institutional set-up that introduces a degree of
target-conservatism. Moreover, target-conservatism reduces average ination without
compromising on the stabilization of output. This is in concert with the claim by
practitioners that ination targeting need not imply that the stabilization of output is ignored
(Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997; King, 1997).
6Note that the act of delegation to conservative central bankers is discretionary. Therefore, whether or not
credibility can be restored ultimately depends on the cost of changing the monetary regime. This point, put
forward by McCallum (1995), was formalized by Jensen (1998).
7Note that target-conservatism, unlike stability-conservatism, continues to play a useful role in environments
without multiplicative instrument uncertainty.
8This result has already been suggested by various atuhors. See, for example, Blinder (1998, p. 43, no
emphasis added): “a disarmingly simple solution to the Kydland-Prescott problem [is to] direct the central bank
to behave as if it prefers [y
¤]r a t h e rt h a n[ ky
¤]”.
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Empirical studies have suggested that the delegation of monetary policy to an independent
central bank is like a free lunch: it lowers ination without increasing the variability of
output.9 At the theoretical level, this has created an anomaly in the Rogoff (1985) model,
which predicts higher output variability in response to weight-conservatism. Subsequent
researchhasshownthatthefreelunchresultmaybeexplainedby(i)theoffsettinginteraction
between higher ‘economic variability’ due to increased weight-conservatism and lower
‘political variability’ due to better insulation from the political business cycle (Alesina and
Gatti, 1995); (ii) a positive correlation between the degree of central bank independence and
the ability to stabilize or the degree of scal discipline (Fischer, 1995); (iii) the presence of
a second-best delegation scheme (Svensson, 1997b).
This paper argues that conservatism may be consistent with a strong version of the
free lunch result:
PROPOSITION 3: In the presence of multiplicative instrument uncertainty, stability-
conservatism and target-conservatism enhance both nominal and real stability.
The proof follows from the inspection of (13) and (14). To interpret this result, consider
the consequences of stability- and target-conservatism for output variability (the effect on












































in the case of target-conservatism. Note that, in both cases, conservatism does not affect
the rst term and lowers the second term. The rst term is unaffected precisely because
stability- and target-conservatism are optimal forms of conservatism. The second term
decreases because both stability- and target-conservatism are conducive to a more neutral
average stance of policy. A stronger tendency towards policy neutrality reduces the nuisance
of multiplicative randomness.
9See Alesina and Summers (1993), Debelle and Fischer (1994) and Fischer (1995).
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implies that the credibility of monetary policy, too, can help preventing money from being a
sourceofvariability. Theimplicationsforthefreelunchresultofdelegationarethustwofold.
First of all, delegation to a conservative central banker does not entail suboptimal output
stabilization if conservatismis not arbitrarily restricted to the notion of weight-conservatism.
Alternative forms of conservatism, such as stability-conservatism and target-conservatism,
reduce the inationary bias without distorting the stabilization of output. Second, any
delegation scheme which improves or removes the credibility problem of monetary policy
reduces at the same time the variability of output (and of ination), if the transmission of
monetary policy is subject to multiplicative uncertainty.
The overall theoretical implication is thus, surprisingly, that delegation based on
optimal notions of conservatism should not only lead to lower ination but also to less
variable output. Strictly speaking, the empirical nding that delegation does not affect
output variability could then be taken as evidence that the delegation schemes in place are
not optimal. Observers may in fact argue that central banks favor nominal stability to real
stability (µ¤
1=µ¤
2 >µ 1=µ2), leading to suboptimal output stabilization but possibly identical
degrees of output variability across institutional regimes.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has addressed the question whether society benets from the delegation of
monetary policy to cautious and conservative central bankers. The framework that we have
used extends the credibility literature with a more general description of preferences and
uncertainty. We have made three points. First, while caution reduces the inationary bias
at the cost of a less aggressive response to output shocks, this does not obviate the role
for weight-conservatism. Weight-conservatism remains helpful in further reducing average
ination although an interesting trade-off emerges between the degree of uncertainty and
the optimal level of weight-conservatism. Economies characterized by a large credibility
problem will benet from delegation to central bankers who become increasingly ‘ultra-
conservative’ in the face of greater uncertainty. Second, and this is the key insight,
the paper suggests a reconsideration of the concept of conservatism. Previous work has
generally focused on suboptimal concepts. With a more exible specication of preferences,
we have derived new notions of conservatism termed ‘stability-conservatism’ and ‘target-
conservatism’. These can in principle restore the best feasible equilibrium. Third, the
20                                                                                                   ECB Working Paper No 25 l  July 2000conservative-central-banker approach is not necessarily inconsistent with the free lunch
result of delegation. We have shown how conservatism may not only lead to lower ination
but also to a lower variability of output.
We close with some limitations of the model and ideas for future work. For
reasons of comparability, we have preferred to keep with the credibility literature and
therefore chose the simplest possible description of monetary policy transmission. Adding a
dynamic structure to the transmission mechanismwould be a worthwhileextension. Another
limitation is that the model features purely exogenous transmission uncertainty and that it
abstracts from the issue of learning. We have not developed the model in this direction.
Nevertheless, as suggested by Caplin and Leahy (1996), the possibility of learning should
be kept in mind, especially if systematic search behavior of the policy maker inuences the
response of the private sector to policy. Finally, the model abstracts from the endogeneity
of preferences to economic outcomes. Future work could analyze whether the interaction
between variability and aversion to variability leads to monetary arrangements designed to
foster stability in the future.
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First, note that, for 0 · ®¤ · ®; the rst term in (A1) is strictly negative while the second
one is only weakly negative. As a result, @Q=@®¤ < 0: Second, the sign of @Q=@®¤ must
become positive for large values of ®¤. To see this, note that the r s tt e r mi n( A 1)i sn e g a t i v e
while the second term is positive (for ®¤ >® ). Both terms converge to 0 as ®¤ approaches
+1.T h e rst term converges at rate ®¤¡3, while the second term converges only at rate
®¤¡2.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,@Q=@®¤ must become positive as ®¤ ! +1.




































































These partial derivatives can be signed as follows:
©¾2














This completes the proof.
References
Alesina, Alberto and Summers, Lawrence H. “Central Bank Independence and
Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence.” Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking,M a y1993, 25(2), pp. 151-62.
Alesina, Alberto and Gatti, Roberta. “How Independent Should the Central Bank Be?”
American Economic Review,M a y1995 (Papers and Proceedings), 85(2), pp. 196-200.
Ball, Laurence and Cecchetti, Stephen G. “Ination and Uncertainty at Long and Short
Horizons.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1990, (1), pp. 215-54.
Barro, Robert J. and Gordon, David B. “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a
Natural Rate Model.” Journal of Political Economy, August 1983a, 91(4), pp. 589-610.
22                                                                                                     ECB Working Paper No 25 l  July 2000. “Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy.” Journal of
Monetary Economics, July 1983b, 12(1), pp. 101-21.
Bernanke, Ben S. and Mishkin, Frederic S. “Ination Targeting: A New Framework for
Monetary Policy?” Journal of Economic Perspectives,S p r i n g1997, 22(2), pp. 97-116.
Blinder, Alan S. Central Banking in Theory and Practice. Cambridge, MA; London: MIT
Press, 1998.
Brainard, William C. “Uncertainty and the Effectiveness of Policy.” American Economic
Review,J u n e1967, 57(3), pp. 411-25.
Canzoneri, Matthew B. “Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information.”
American Economic Review, December 1985, 75(5), pp. 1056-1070.
Caplin, Andrew and Leahy, John. “Monetary Policy as a Process of Search.” American
Economic Review,S e p t e m b e r1996, 86(4), pp. 689-702.
Craine, Roger. “Optimal Monetary Policy with Uncertainty.” Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control,F e b r u a r y1979, 1(1), pp. 59-83.
Debelle, Guy and Fischer, Stanley. “How Independent Should a Central Bank Be?,” in
Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, ed., Goals, Guidelines and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers,
Conference Series, no. 38, Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1994, pp. 195-221.
Devereux, Michael. “The Effects of Monetary Variability on Welfare in a Simple
Macroeconomic Model.” Journal of Monetary Economics,M a y1987, 19(3), pp. 427-35.
Fischer, Stanley. “Modern Central Banking,” in Forrest Capie et al., eds., The Future of
Central Banking, Cambridge, England; New York; Melbourne: Cambridge University Press,
1994, pp. 262-308.
. “Central-Bank Independence Revisited.” American Economic Review,M a y
1995 (Papers and Proceedings), 85(2), pp. 201-206.
ECB Working Paper No 25 l  July 2000                                                                                                    23Flood, Robert P. and Isard, Peter. “Monetary Policy Strategies.” International Monetary
Fund Staff Papers, September 1989, 36(3), pp. 612-32.
Friedman, Milton. “The Role of Monetary Policy.” American Economic Review,M a r c h
1968, 56(1), pp. 1-17.
Herrendorf, Berthold and Lockwood, Ben. “Rogoff’s Conservative Central Banker
Restored.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,N o v e m b e r1997, Part 1, 29(4), pp. 476-
95.
Holland, A. Steven. “Uncertain Effects of Money and the Link between the Ination Rate
and Ination Uncertainty.” Economic Inquiry,J a n u a r y1993, 31(1), pp. 39-51.
Jensen, Henrik. “Credibility of Optimal Monetary Delegation.” American Economic
Review, December 1997, 87(5), pp. 911-20.
Judd, John P. and Scadding, John L. “The Search for a Stable Money Demand Function:
A Survey of the Post-1973 Literature.” Journal of Economic Literature, September 1982,
20(3), pp. 993-1023.
King, Mervyn. “Changes in UK Monetary Policy: Rules and Discretion in Practice.”
Journal of Monetary Economics,J u n e1997, 39(1), pp. 81-97.
Kydland, Finn E. and Prescott, Edward C. “Rules Rather than Discretion: The
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans.” Journal of Political Economy, 1977, 85(3), pp. 473-92.
Letterie, Wilko. “Better Monetary Control May Decrease the Distortion of stabilization
Policy: A Comment.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, September 1997, 99(3), pp. 463-
470.
Lohmann, Susanne. “Optimal Precommitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus
Flexibility.” American Economic Review,M a r c h1992, 82(1), pp. 273-86.
McCallum, Bennett T. “Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence.” American
Economic Review,M a y1995 (Papers and Proceedings), 85(2), pp. 207-11.
24                                                                                                    ECB Working Paper No 25 l  July 2000Obstfeld, Maurice. “Destabilizing Effects of Exchange Rate Escape Clauses.” Journal of
International Economics, August 1997, 43(1-2), pp. 61-77.
Pearce, Douglas and Sobue, Motoshi. “Uncertainty and the Ination Bias of Monetary
Policy.” Economics Letters, December 1997, 57(2), pp. 203-7.
Persson, Torsten and Tabellini, Guido. “Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability.”
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, December 1993, 39, pp. 53-84.
Poole, William. “Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic
Macro Model.” Quarterly Journal of Economics,M a y1970, 84(2), pp. 197-216.
Rogoff, Kenneth. “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Target.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1985, 100(4), pp. 1169-90.
Sargent, Thomas J. “Discussion of ‘Policy Rules for Open Economies’ by Laurence Ball.”
Mimeo, University of Chicago, April 1998.
Svensson, Lars E. O. “Ination Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Ination
Targets.” European Economic Review,J u n e1997a, 41(6), pp. 1111-46.
. “Optimal Ination Targets, ‘Conservative’ Central Banks, and Linear Ination
Contracts.” American Economic Review, March 1997b, 87(1), pp. 98-114.
Swank, Otto. “Better Monetary Control May Increase the Inationary Bias of Policy.”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1994, 96(1), pp. 125-31.
Taylor, John B. “On the Relation between the Variability of Ination and the Average
Ination Rate.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Autumn 1981,
15, pp. 57-86.
Waller, Christopher J. and Walsh, Carl E. “Central-Bank Independence, Economic
Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths.” American Economic Review, December 1996, 86(5),
pp. 1139-53.
ECB Working Paper No 25 l  July 2000                                                                           25. “The Choice of a Conservative Central Banker in a Multisector Economy.”
American Economic Review,S e p t e m b e r1992, 82(4), pp. 1006-12.
Walsh, Carl E. “Optimal Contracts for Independent Central Bankers.” American Economic
Review,M a r c h1995, 85(1), pp. 150-67.






























































7 .@ 	(	(	 	
	-($%===
8 +(
























 * 		# (
,A	 
.*C$: ===
/ +(B	
50D,	.:"$: ===
2 '	
		(

!"$: ===
7 , 		#		(	
;"$: ===